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Partisan theories of political economy expect that bondholders will panic 
with the election of a left-wing presidential candidate. The latter seems to be 
what happened in Brazil in the 2002 presidential elections. However, quanti-
tative analysis of perceptions of sovereign credit risk in Argentine, Brazilian, 
Mexican, and Venezuelan presidential elections from 1994 until 2007 shows 
no real evidence of a link between partisanship and perceptions of risk, even 
if the left-right divide is further broken down into left, center-left, center-
right, right. Instead, international and domestic economic fundamentals have 
a stronger influence on risk evaluations. Qualitative analysis of the individual 
presidential elections shows the importance of policy uncertainty in explain-
ing why certain electoral periods seemed more critical than others and how 
bondholders select between multiple equilibria. This research helps shift 
political analysis away from partisanship and more in the direction of poli-
cies and articulation.
Keywords:   partisan theories; political economy; political uncertainty; 
sovereign risk; Latin America
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re-election bid in 2006. Nor did the victories of left-leaning Cristina 
Fernández in Argentina or even the re-election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela 
have much of an effect. The most recent literature argues that it is not the 
left per se but a shift to the left that leads to concern among bondholders 
(Vaaler, Schrage, & Block, 2006). This would explain the reactions to the 
aforementioned elections but not the lack of response to Andrés Manual 
López Obrador almost winning the presidency in Mexico in 2006. An 
alternative answer might be that risk was minimal because international 
economic conditions were highly favorable to commodity producers and 
international reserves were considerable (Singh, 2005). But does this expla-
nation hold up over time, particularly during episodes of depressed global 
liquidity and demand for commodities?
This article finds that, contrary to much of the political economy litera-
ture on the subject, party ideology is not an important determinant in move-
ments in sovereign risk during presidential elections in emerging markets, 
whereas external vulnerability, global appetite for risk, and predictability of 
policies are. Based on financial data during national elections in Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela between 1994 and 2007, the article uses a 
multimethod approach of qualitative, historical analysis of electoral cam-
paigns combined with quantitative, statistical analysis of bond spread 
movements, partisan ideology, party system institutionalization, reserves, 
and other factors.
The article begins with brief reviews of partisan and structural approaches 
and the role of uncertainty in explaining election-related outcomes. It then 
explains the data and classification of elections used. The subsequent section 
presents quantitative and qualitative analyses, with the intention of testing 
theories emerging from perspectives that emphasize partisan identity, global 
conditions, and policy uncertainty. Most specifically, it quantitatively tests the 
following hypotheses based on the partisan approach, which bondholders 
perceive: a victory of the left as negative; a shift from right to left as negative; 
left to right as positive; and left to left as neutral; a distinction between left, 
center-left, center-right, and right; and so on. An additional variable measuring 
party system institutionalization is included to see if this conditions partisan 
response. Statistical analyses also test assumptions of the importance of global 
conditions and domestic vulnerability by including in the model international 
reserve holdings, market volatility, and commodity prices. Historical analysis 
of each electoral episode complements and advances the statistical tests by 
indicating that interactions between policy uncertainty and external vulnera-
bility, not partisanship, explain variance in perception of sovereign risk during 
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elections. The inclusion of qualitative analysis is important in contextualizing 
political phenomena to explain why outcomes differ when international mar-
ket conditions appear to be similar.
Elections and the Economy: Theoretical Models
No single theory can explain the complex relationship between political 
moments, such as elections, on financial and economic variables. The 
central claim in this article is that a combination of global economic condi-
tions, local foreign currency reserves, and domestic policy uncertainty, rather 
than partisanship and ideology, provides the most complete understanding 
of the relationship between elections and the economy in a globalized world.
Partisan Models
Although classical partisan models of political economy emphasize how 
the partisan identity of a government affects economic indicators in devel-
oped countries (Alesina, Roubini, & Cohen, 1997; Hibbs, 1977), recent 
contributions analyze developing countries and give more attention to the 
way that electoral periods affect financial markets as opposed to macroeco-
nomic indicators. Using financial market data from 1975-1998 for 78 
developing countries, David Leblang (2002) found that speculative attacks 
are most likely to occur during a left-wing government and after an elec-
tion. Block and Vaaler (2004) and Vaaler et al. (2006), using data from 20 
developing countries, find that financial markets are most concerned about 
a shift to the left during elections but not the re-election of a candidate of 
the left. These studies seem to confirm the basic premises of partisan theo-
ries: (a) that market actors distinguish politicians of the left and the right; 
(b) once in office, politicians justify such distinctions; and (c) market actors 
make investment decisions during electoral periods based on the ideology 
of the likely victor.
Although these studies are very interesting as large-N studies, they are 
limited by the need to maintain comparability of data (George & Bennett, 
2005). For example, they face a problem of what Herron (2000) calls 
“magnitude of partisanship,” or how far the distance is between left and 
right (p. 327). Investors are unlikely to consider the partisan effect of a 
Michael Foot or a Tony Blair identical, though statistical analysis labels 
them both as left. Similarly, if Castañeda is correct, there should be markedly 
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different responses to Latin America’s moderate, institutionalist left; and its 
radical, populist, and anti-institutionalist left (Castañeda & Navia, 2007). 
Moreover, even if the left-right divide can be assumed to be equivalent in 
large-N studies, the analyst must also understand the meaning in terms of 
the institutionalization of the party system (Mainwaring, 1999).
This article adopts a two-pronged strategy to evaluate the effect of par-
tisanship and the electoral cycle on risk perceptions. First, it includes a 
specific variable for party system institutionalization, which conditions the 
clarity of party’s ideology and brand names (Vaaler et al., 2006). Second, it 
investigates in detail the role of partisan explanations vis-à-vis other theories 
through an in-depth discussion of each country.
Global Constraints
New partisan research recognizes the importance of contextual varia-
tion—specifically that “in small, open economies, domestic policy makers 
may retain less autonomy over some policies . . . than in larger, less-ex-
posed economies” (Franzese, 2002, p. 371). External constraints on domes-
tic policy making have long been a concern in Latin America, and much of 
the international political economy literature seems to argue that globaliza-
tion weakens the role of domestic politics, making autonomous policy 
making impossible (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Garrett, 1998; Wallerstein, 
2004).
Susan Strange (as cited in Garrett, 1998) warned that although “states were 
once the masters of markets, now it is markets which, on many crucial 
issues, are the masters over the governments of states” (p. 787). In his study 
of capital mobility and development in Latin America, Mahon (1996) finds 
support for the idea of a virtual senate of asset holders because of con-
straints they impose on domestic policy; a similar argument is made by 
Mosley (2003), who argues that investors have a powerful voice in emerg-
ing market countries’ political arenas.
Without a doubt, world commodity prices and risk tolerance on global 
capital markets play a fundamental role in providing constraints and oppor-
tunities for emerging markets. Similarly, capital flows into and out of one 
emerging market are often very influenced by events in another emerging 
market or in the region as a whole. But contagion is often exaggerated and 
bondholders do distinguish on the basis of policy choices and investment 
climates particular to an emerging market.
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Uncertainty
A third hypothesis is that bondholders pay careful attention to domestic 
policies and give considerable attention to electoral campaigns, shifting 
financial assets not on the basis of politician ideology but on the presence 
or absence of clear and credible policy. Spanakos and Renno (2006) make 
this claim in their study of economic and financial responses to electoral 
periods in Brazil (2006). Similarly, Starr (1999) argues that Argentine 
economy adjusted better than that of Mexico in 1994-1995, because the former 
“operated in a relatively certain electoral environment,” whereas the coali-
tion supporting the latter was diverse and unable to find consensus (p. 204).
The current article contributes to improving the persuasiveness of the 
uncertainty hypotheses through increasing the number of observations of 
the within-case studies found in Spanakos and Renno (2006) and Starr 
(1999) from 3 and 2 observations, respectively, to 14 distinct electoral 
episodes spread over four countries within the same region. It is clear that 
this hypothesis cannot be easily quantified and tested statistically and there 
are no available measures of campaign uncertainty regarding candidates’ 
proposals. Therefore, the article uses process tracing to identify interaction 
effects between policy uncertainty and external vulnerability.
Data and Variables
This article analyzes sovereign bond market reaction to electoral cam-
paigns and postelectoral periods in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela 
between 1994 and 2007, using a monthly time-series data set for each case. 
These countries were selected because of the importance of their markets,1 
and they display a range of partisan and policy orientations, offering a 
diverse set of situations that can be analyzed. Argentina, Brazil, and 
Venezuela all witnessed some shift toward the left in the period studied. 
Although Mexico had no governments of the left, the candidate of the left 
came within 1 percentage point of winning the 2006 elections. The shift 
toward the left in the 2002 election in Brazil, in all analyzed elections in 
Venezuela, and to a lesser extent in 2003 in Argentina and 2006 in Mexico, 
constitutes “crucial cases” in evaluating partisan theories (Eckstein, 1975, 
p. 118). The other observations produce results unexpected by partisan 
accounts—namely, support for Chávez in 2004 coincided with a decrease 
in risk; his election in 2006 had little effect, yet the re-election of Menem 
(Argentina, 1995) and Cardoso (Brazil, 1998) did.
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The indicator of risk, the dependent variable in both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, is JP Morgan Chase’s Emerging Markets Bond Index 
(EMBI). The EMBI is the price that investors are willing to pay for the 
sovereign debt of a given country at a specific moment in time. It is the 
spread of the yield of a sovereign bond relative to that of a U.S. Treasury 
bond (considered a zero-risk benchmark) of a similar maturity.2 Increasing 
in the cost of government borrowing raises the cost of borrowing across the 
economy, slowing growth and increasing indebtedness. When debt is 
denominated in foreign currency, this places additional pressures on mon-
etary policy and foreign exchange reserves.
The EMBI is not a pure measure of political risk. First, it reflects the 
dynamics within international capital markets, which are external to 
domestic political events.3 Second, it is largely determined by the govern-
ment’s ability to pay its debt, which is based on the size (relative to exports), 
maturity (how long before it must make payments), and composition of 
debt (if denominated in a foreign currency or linked to some benchmark 
rate). Finally, the EMBI includes perceptions of willingness to pay debt. 
Candidates claiming that they will not pay foreign debt while locals are 
starving (e.g., Lula in the 1980s) or governments that prioritize redistribu-
tion of assets over protection of property rights of asset holders drive up 
political risk (e.g., Chávez since 1998).
Despite these limitations, the EMBI is the benchmark used by bondhold-
ers (whose behavior is being studied) and is also used in a number of 
political economy studies (Bernard & Leblang, 2006). Moreover, it is the 
best available measure of investor perception of sovereign credit risk and a 
baseline indicator of general credit risk.
Although risk can be quantified based on probabilistic statistical projec-
tions, uncertainty resists such methods. Given a situation where a govern-
ment will loosen monetary policy to spur spending, analysts can predict the 
possible effect that this will have on inflation and evaluate this in terms of 
the present value of a debt instrument. When a new president comes into 
office and has given no signals whether previous monetary policies will be 
continued, loosened, or abandoned altogether, uncertainty exists, making it 
more difficult to make accurate predictions of risk. The distinction between 
risk and uncertainty is largely heuristic, however, as bondholders, particu-
larly in emerging markets, tend to conflate the two. Because bondholders 
must make decisions about portfolio allocations regardless of the quantifi-
ability of conditions of uncertainty, there is a tendency to overshoot estima-
tions of uncertainty and for this to play a more significant role in analysis 
of emerging market bond markets.
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The independent variables included in the analysis are derived from the 
theories discussed previously. A first central variable is the indicator of 
ideological change during the electoral period. A caveat must be made in 
identifying presidential candidates as being on the left or right, because 
partisan identification in Latin America is not always straightforward.4 This 
article will label parties following Michael Coppedge’s work on parties and 
party systems in Latin America (Coppedge, 1998).5 Certain adjustments 
were made because Coppedge identifies parties and winning candidates but 
does not identify caretaker regimes (see Table 1).6
The impact of Coppedge’s (1998) classification of elections is tested 
through the inclusion in the model of dummy variables for each of the dis-
tinct types of changes that occurred in the elections. So all center-right to 
center-left changes become a dummy variable and so forth for all the other 
types of elections.
Party institutionalization is measured as the average age of the top two 
governing parties and the main opposition parties or a subset of according 
to the situation in each country, as defined in the Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001). This variable is 
included in the model to control for the inchoate characteristics of certain 
Latin American party systems, which could weaken the influence of parties 
and ideology on economic turbulence. The expectation is that older party 
systems will decrease risk, because it increases the brand names of parties. 
Party system should also condition the uncertainty present in elections in 
which there are changes toward the left. This situation occurred in the 
presidential elections of the 1999 and 2003 in Argentina, 2002 in Brazil, 
and 1998 in Venezuela. An interaction term was added for the Brazilian 
elections in which a center coalition stayed in power.
Another set of political determinants of risk is associated with traditional 
electoral cycle variables. The first one indicates the 6 months prior to the election, 
with a regressive count from –6 to the –1, from the farthest away month to the 
closest one. As an election approaches, there should be greater risk and therefore 
a positive effect on the EMBI. The second electoral cycle indicator is a progres-
sive count of the 6 months after the election, ranging from 1 to 6. The relation-
ship here should be negative with EMBI, because as one moves away from 
elections, risk should decline as a victor appears and begins to choose ministers 
and coalition partners. This reduces uncertainty surrounding eventual govern-
ment policy. Thus, the election variable, a dummy indicating the month of the 
election, should also have a positive effect on risk assessment.
The next set of variables examines the claim that it is vulnerability to 
external events that explain perceptions of country risk regardless of 
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Table 1
Partisan direction of Electoral Change 
by Election in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela
Country and Election Year Incumbent Winner Partisan Direction
Argentina 1994 Menem Menem Center Right–Center 
     Right (re-election)
Argentina 1999 Menem De La Rua Center Right–Center Left
Argentina 2003 Duhalde Kirchner Center Left–Left
Brazil 1994 Franco Cardoso Center–Center  
     (same coalition)
Brazil 1998 Cardoso Cardoso Center–Center 
     (re-election)
Brazil 2002 Cardoso Lula Center–Left
Brazil 2006 Lula Lula Left–Left (re-election)
Mexico 1994 Salinas Zedillo Center Right–Center 
     Right (same party)
Mexico 2000 Zedillo Fox Center Right–Center  
     Right
Mexico 2006 Fox Calderon Center Right–Center  
     Right (same party)
Venezuela 1998 Caldera Chavez Centera–Left
Venezuela 2000 Chavez Chavez Left–Left (re-election)
Venezuela 2004 Chavez Chavez Left–Left (confirmation)
Venezuela 2006 Chavez Chavez Left–Left (re-election)
a. Rafael Caldera ran as an independent in 1994. His coalition leaned toward the center-left 
during its first 2 years and toward the center-right during its last 2 years. Thus, he is coded as 
centrist.
domestic political events. The analysis used the level of foreign currency 
reserves as a proxy for access to foreign (hard) currency and vulnerability 
to financial crises more generally. This variable was obtained in the 
International Financial Statistics data set from the International Monetary 
Fund and was logged to increase comparability. Because credit risk is what 
is being investigated and so much Latin American debt has been historically 
denominated in dollars or linked to the value of the dollar, this indicator is 
especially important.
In addition to the vulnerability to the external environment, it is also 
important to take into consideration the liquidity of the global market and 
its appetite for risk. Two variables are included in the model. The Chicago 
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, which indicates volatility over a 
period of 30 days in the S&P 500 is a widely used indicator of risk appetite 
1300   Comparative Political Studies
among investors. Because investors consider global market conditions, the 
lower the volatility in the S&P 500, the more willing investors should be to 
purchase higher risk instruments, such as emerging market bonds. In addi-
tion, as the export profiles of the economies analyzed earn a significant 
portion of money from commodities and emerging markets are more likely 
to receive investment booms when commodity prices increase, a measure 
of global commodity prices, PALLFNFW, derived from the International 
Monetary Fund is used. The PALLFNFW is a combined measure of the 
price indices for all fuel and nonfuel commodities. This indicator is used, 
because it is the most holistic index of commodity prices and all of the 
governments analyzed here, to varying degrees, export petroleum and/or 
natural gas, as well as other commodities. 
The model also controls for local factors including the Consumer Price 
Index and Central Bank independence, the latter measured by the length of 
tenure of each bank’s president or governor (Cukierman, 1992; Cukierman, 
Webb, & Neyapti, 1992). The expectation is that longer tenure is perceived 
by investors to mean more independence and therefore should reduce the 
effect of elections on uncertainty.
Analysis
The pooled sample of countries is analyzed using cross-sectional time-
series linear models with feasible generalized least squares correcting for 
AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and heteroskedasticity across panels. 
A model is tested with the conditional effect of party system age (Model 2) 
and without interaction terms (Model 1). Fixed effects by country are esti-
mated to control for other country-specific factors that are not modeled. For 
each individual country, Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression is used with robust 
standard errors, which corrects serious autocorrelation problems found 
within panels and for cross-panel heteroskedasticity violation.7 A lagged 
term of the dependent variable to control for possible layover effects from 
1 month to the next is also included in the models.
Results are presented in Table 2. The most influential variables in explain-
ing EMBI variation over time and space are the lagged term of the dependent 
variable, the natural logarithm of international reserves, and Central Bank 
independence. Volatility Index (VIX) is influential in the pooled sample and 
in Brazil, whereas commodity prices are significant for Mexico. All vary in 
the expected direction. That is, the size of the reserves, central bank inde-
pendence, and commodity prices all have a negative correlation with the 
Spanakos, Renno / Sovereign Risk, Ideology, and Presidential Elections   1301
EMBI. The same relationship exists in most cases between the VIX and the 
EMBI. The political variables, however, perform very poorly. None is statisti-
cally significant, which indicates that the electoral cycle, characteristic of the 
change in parties and levels of party institutionalization do not affect risk 
evaluations. This suggests that sovereign risk is relatively indifferent to the 
political situation. The exception here is Brazil, in which the election month, 
a change from center to left (Cardoso to Lula in 2002), and the interaction 
between party institutionalization and center to left change all influence risk.
The election month always has a soothing effect on risk, and during the 
actual month of the election, risk normally decreases. The change from 
Cardoso to Lula did affect risk, but it appears to be an isolated effect when 
compared to the other Latin American countries analyzed here. The effect 
of the change from center to left was also conditional on the level of party 
institutionalization in Brazil. For a 1-unit change in year of party system, 
there was a significant reduction in the negative impact of the center to left 
change that occurred in 2002. Therefore, in Brazil, party system institution-
alization has the expected theoretical effect. But the absence of a party 
system effect suggests that the effect in Brazil in 2002 may have been 
caused not by the youth of the Workers’ Party per se but the uncertainty 
generated by the potential of its leading a government coalition. The pos-
sibility that regression analysis in this and the other elections analyzed 
might be missing part of the story or important interactive effects leads to 
the next section, which qualitatively analyzes the 14 cases.
A Historical Analysis of Uncertainty and Elections
The elections that most significantly increased the perception of sovereign 
risk were those of 1995 in Argentina, 1998 and 2002 in Brazil, and 1998 in 
Venezuela. The partisan effect here is ambiguous at best. Even the policy 
uncertainty hypothesis is not completely straightforward, as there may have 
been more policy uncertainty in other elections. However, the interaction 
between policy uncertainty and external economic conditions and domestic 
reserves explain why these four episodes generated the greatest risk. The 
next section relies on process-tracing through within-case analysis to iden-
tify when and how policy uncertainty and external vulnerability produced 
sensations of risk (George & Bennett, 2005, ch. 10). The analysis highlights 
results unexpected by partisan theories such as the increase in the EMBI 
during the 1995 elections in Argentina, the 1998 elections in Brazil, the 
lack of change in the 2006 elections in Mexico, and the decrease during the 
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revocatory referendum in 2004 in Venezuela. Examining these examples of 
deviance provides alternative explanations for the increase in perception of 
risk in Argentina in 2003, Brazil in 2002, and Venezuela in 1998—cases 
that are crucial for partisan theories.
Argentina
The three presidential elections studied here show the re-election in 
1995 of Carlos Menem, the center-right president; the 1999 election of 
Gustavo de la Rua, leading a center-left coalition; and the 2003 victory of 
Nestor Kirchner, a leftist peronist.8 Risk peaked 2 to 3 months prior to all 
elections, but the most troubling were the elections of 1995 and 2003, not 
1999 and 2003, as partisan theories predict (see Table 3). The question is, 
what explains why the re-election of Menem coincided with an increase in 
perception of risk? And does that explanation hold for the slight increase in 
1999 and significant increase in 2003?
Menem eliminated hyperinflation, and his victory over Frepaso’s José 
Octávio Bordón was by 20 points.9 The margin of victory and the re-election 
of a market-preferred center-right candidate should not have contributed to 
an increase in risk. At one point, Bordón’s Frepaso coalition did threaten 
the Menem candidacy, but as The Economist (“Argentina shades,” 1994) 
reported, “no serious candidate today . . . proposes even to reverse the free-
market reforms” (p. 38); nor was there any challenge to the convertibility 
plan (which constitutionally established the peso as equal to 1 dollar). What 
was concerning was how Argentina would adjust to the fallout from the 
devaluation of the Mexican peso, which had affected perception of credit-
worthiness in the region as a whole. These concerns slowed support for 
Bordón as “Argentines think . . . who better to find solutions, ask Peronists, 
than the slayers of hyperinflation?” (“Argentina fighting,” 1995, p. 43). To 
bond holders, a vote for Menem meant the continuation of a relatively 
predictable and credible set of policies and policy makers. Nevertheless, 
the increased electoral strength of Frepaso and the increased independence 
of Peronist politicians meant that the next government would face more 
constraints on its ability to make potentially unpopular reforms. This can 
be seen by the increase in the EMBI following the elections, which sug-
gests that there were indeed governability concerns. These concerns were 
exacerbated by the shift toward risk aversion that followed the Mexican 
devaluation. As investors became more risk averse, the premium on 
reserves and policy uncertainty increased. Thus, the best explanation for 
the unexpected rise in the EMBI in 1995 is due to an interaction of political 
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uncertainty—related to Menem’s ability to maintain governability and disci-
pline over his coalition—and the change in investor sentiment following 
Mexico’s devaluation. That said, Menem’s popular support and credibility 
served as a break on the increased perception of credit risk. It is clear that the 
role of party ideology of the victorious party was irrelevant.
The 1999 election had a much less significant effect, although the two-
term president was replaced by a shift toward the left. Both Eduardo 
Duhalde, two-term Peronist governor of Buenos Aires province, and cen-
trist Fernando de la Rua, a former mayor of Buenos Aires representing the 
center-left Frepaso coalition, critiqued Menem, but neither offered a break 
with fundamental macroeconomic policies. Even still, the size of a debt 
essentially denominated in dollars had become worrisome and “[i]nvestors 
have started to worry that Argentina’s exchange rate, even though its parity 
with the dollar is written into law, could yet go the way of its much less 
rigidly pegged counterpart in Brazil” (“Leaders,” 1999, p. 15). To this end, 
both candidates insisted on their maintenance of the currency board, thus 
giving clear signals of policy continuity. However, unlike the 1995 elec-
tions, global conditions were more favorable. Thus, with little uncertainty 
about broad fundamental issues, there was no reason to expect a short-term 
spark that would deepen concern, though worries remained about the long-
term policy mix.
In 2003, Menem challenged a progressive coalition of Peronists behind 
Nestor Kirchner. The Economist (“The Americas,” 2003) writes: “[i]n pol-
icy terms, the run-off is a battle between Mr. Menem’s glitzy conservatism 
and Mr. Kirchner’s nebulous social democracy” (p. 57). The ambiguity of 
Kirchner’s proposals as well as his status as an unknown governor of 
Patagonia forced Kirchner to engage credibility-building exercises such as 
securing support from caretaker president Eduardo Duhalde who, despite 
having defaulted and devalued, regained credibility among bondholders. 
Kirchner’s post-Washington consensus left-wing appeal was bolstered by 
linking himself to Lula rather than Chávez.10 Finally, his trump card was 
publicly declaring that he would maintain Roberto Lavagna as finance min-
ister, a definitive commitment to maintain policies that were considered 
credible and predictable (“The Americas,” 2003, p. 57). In addition, the 
2003 election occurred as global growth and particularly commodity prices 
were rapidly rising. The increase in the EMBI, however, despite improving 
commodity prices, global liquidity, and a return of investment to Argentina, 
suggests that the international environment was not enough. Kirchner’s 
attempts to reduce policy uncertainty clearly helped but were insufficient as 
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both his vision of post-Washington Consensus, and the possible governability 
issues that he might face were never persuasively settled during the cam-
paign. The postelection increase in the EMBI supports this latter point.
Brazil
The Brazilian EMBI increased prior to the 1998 and 2002 elections, but 
there was little effect prior to the 2006 elections, and it decreased prior to the 
1994 elections. The increase in the pre-electoral periods in 2002 and the lack 
of concern in 2006 is predicted by partisan theories, but that of 1998 is not 
(Vaaler et al., 2006). As with the 1995 elections in Argentina, an examina-
tion of the unexpected rise in risk in 1998 explains the limitations of partisan 
approaches. The evidence suggests that the concern in 1998 was about 
Cardoso’s ability to respond to exchange rate pressures introduced by inter-
national crisis, not about Cardoso per se or the credibility of his particular 
group of policy makers. In contrast, in 2002, the concern was the inability to 
predict what policies Lula might pursue as president particularly amid risk 
aversion on global markets and moderate levels of external vulnerability. 
The ideology of the Workers’ Party candidate did not play a significant role 
in increasing perception of sovereign risk.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the finance minister who was credited as 
having engineered the remarkably successful exchange-rate based stabiliza-
tion real plan,11 won the 1994 presidential elections against Lula da Silva 
of the Workers’ Party. As support for Cardoso’s candidacy increased, the 
likelihood of continuation of policies that were considered viable by bond-
holders increased, and the perception of default risk decreased considera-
bly. In addition, the interest of bondholders to re-enter Latin American 
markets in the early 1990s contributed to a reduction in perception of risk.
The Brazilian electoral campaign of 1998 followed the Asian (1997) and 
Russian (1998) crises, which centered around currency mismatches and cur-
rent account problems and led to several devaluations and one major default. 
The realities of electoral politics forced president and candidate Cardoso to 
defend the real prior to the elections, creating considerable opportunities for 
speculation, reducing foreign reserves, and driving up the EMBI (as debt 
levels were harder to sustain). One month before the elections, Cardoso 
increased interest rates to defend the real, while Lula proposed a referendum 
on whether capital controls should be imposed (Moffett & Fritsch, 1998). It 
is not surprising that despite the vulnerability of the Brazilian market to the 
global financial malaise, bondholders believed that Cardoso could more 
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credibly weather the storm of contagion and constrain inflationary impulses 
of a possible devaluation than Lula could. Nevertheless, the appeal for 
Lula’s discourse and the potential risks of holding together a reform coali-
tion following a potential devaluation was a concern, as is evidenced by the 
postelection increase in the EMBI (when the devaluation occurred). Thus, as 
in the case of the Argentine elections in 1995, external factors spurred an 
increase the risk associated with governability, but the selection of the pre-
ferred candidate contained perceptions of risk.
In 2002, Lula, now a center-left moderate, was the forerunner among a 
field of candidates who ubiquitously proposed a rather ambiguous concept: 
change. Given Lula and the Workers’ Party’s historic resistance to policies 
that bondholders favored and the Workers’ Party’s lack of experience in 
national governments, there were questions about what Lula would do once 
in office. The clarity demanded by bondholders was especially important, 
given the debt default in Argentina in December of the previous year and 
the generally low risk tolerance in capital markets. Lula’s “Letter to the 
Brazilian People” outlined a sense of fiscal responsibility and moderate 
principles, but before and after releasing that letter, he also spoke of rene-
gotiating contracts and made comments about future monetary and fiscal 
policy that conflicted with the very content of his letter (Spanakos & 
Renno, 2006). The increase in the EMBI led to increased interest rates, a 
weakening of the exchange rate, and accelerating inflation, which contrib-
uted to exploding Brazilian debt, as some 80% of debt was based on those 
rates. The collapse of Argentina was troubling for investors, but commodity 
prices were increasing throughout the campaign. Thus, the international 
environment presented a situation of multiple equilibria. The ambiguous 
content and inability to predict policies of a future Lula government 
encouraged bondholders to favor the more negative equilibrium and created 
a space for an attack on the real.
Once elected, Lula decreased uncertainty through several credibility-
building exercises (the choice of Antonio Palocci as finance minister and 
Henrique Meirelles as central bank governor, as well as increasing the fiscal 
surplus target set by the International Monetary Fund agreement; see Sola, 
2006), which set clear guidelines for the type of policies that would charac-
terize his government. The shift to policies endorsed by his predecessor and 
investors was crucial in the rapid reduction in the EMBI in 2003 and its 
continued decline during his term in office. His re-election in 2006 posed no 
threat, because his policies were both predictable and had received relatively 
favorable reviews from market analysts. In addition, 2006 was a year of 
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robust global growth, considerable liquidity in international markets, and 
high prices for commodities, which reduced the financing pressures on 
nearly all emerging markets.
Mexico
Although the Mexican sample only provides victories of the center right, 
it contains the elections that produced the end of a one-party regime (2000) 
and intensely contested elections (2006). The lack of a significantly 
increase in the EMBI during the pre-electoral periods is because all 
Mexican elections took place during relatively good moments for global 
capital markets, the role of Central Bank autonomy, and policy convergence 
among Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI or Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party) and Partido Acción Nacional (PAN or National Action Party) 
technocrats and politicians.
The beginning of the North American Free Trade Agreement in January 
1994 was an event highlighted by the Chiapas Rebellion and the assassina-
tions of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio and PRI president 
José Francisco Ruiz Massieu. Pressures on the government were consider-
able, yet neither of the two preeminent candidates, the PRI’s Ernesto 
Zedillo nor Diego Fernández de Cevallos, proposed any significant change 
in either monetary or fiscal policy. An increase in the U.S. federal funds rate 
placed pressure on the peso, which forced the government to spend foreign 
currency reserves and shift toward dollar-denominated short-term bonds 
with high interest rates. But importantly, it was not until after Zedillo took 
office and, as a response to the reduction of reserves, devalued the currency 
that the EMBI increased considerably. In addition, despite concerns about 
Chiapas, Mexico had been enjoying a foreign investment boom and led 
emerging market countries in regaining the attention of global investors. 
Thus, the election took place during a period of generous global credit 
markets and domestic policy clarity, though there was domestic tightening 
of credit and an increase in concern about political risk.
The critical political transition—the first time an opposition candidate had 
been allowed to win the presidency since the Mexican Revolution—made 
possible by the 2000 elections generated only a moderate increase in the 
EMBI. The victorious PAN was a probusiness party, and its candidate, 
Vicente Fox, a liberal, made it clear that political change was about eliminat-
ing authoritarianism and corruption, not reversing economic reforms. There 
were concerns about whether the PRI, as it moved to the opposition, would 
become more populist and less liberal, but concerns about the Mexican gov-
ernment’s future policies and willingness to meet its debt obligations 
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were limited. In addition, although the U.S. stock market had crashed, the 
real economy in the United States had not yet slowed and Mexican reserves 
remained strong. As such, the external environment remained relatively favo-
rable. Thus, in the midst of relatively favorable external conditions and clar-
ity about macroeconomic policy, political transition did not increase risk.
Felipe Calderón, a political conservative and supporter of free market 
enterprise, represented no threat to markets when he won the 2006 elections 
as the candidate of the PAN. Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador’s (known in 
Mexico as AMLO) program for government was remarkably similar to that 
of Lula and other center-left leaders, and he sent road shows to Wall Street 
to assure them of his commitment to fiscal responsibility and his respect for 
central bank independence. Although he had been critical of fiscal con-
straint under neoliberal governments, he demonstrated fiscal responsibility 
while he was governor of the Federal District. The Economist (“Leaders,” 
2006) rejected the idea raised by the Calderón campaign that AMLO was 
“a Mexican version of Hugo Chavez,” though it was not clear if he was a 
“modern social democrat” like Lula (p. 10).
Why did electing Lula panic markets while almost electing AMLO did 
not? Here the perception of Central Bank autonomy in conditioning policy 
choices and maintaining policy continuity seems to explain why electing 
Lula panicked markets while almost electing AMLO did not. Although The 
Economist was concerned about contempt that AMLO had shown for insti-
tutions, such as the Central Bank, the Mexican Central Bank had been de 
jure and de facto independent since 1993 and was widely regarded for its 
competence and nonpartisan analysis. This is distinct from the election of 
Lula in 2002, where the Central Bank’s recently achieved de facto autonomy 
was the result of the relationship between Cardoso and his Central Bank 
governors. It had not been institutionalized, and Lula had rejected legisla-
tion to make autonomy and/or independence formal. AMLO’s critiques 
were unlikely to change Central Bank direction, although it was unclear 
whether Lula would follow up on statements about widening the band for 
inflation targets and reducing the role of the finance ministry vis-à-vis the 
planning ministry, either of which would have considerably reduced Central 
Bank autonomy. Finally, the high price of petroleum, Mexico’s main export, 
and the general state of Mexico’s debt profile also contributed to a muted 
sense of risk. The perception of a low-risk institutional environment contin-
ued after the election even amid AMLO’s postelectoral protests and setting 
up of a “shadow government.” As a result, the potential victory of AMLO 
might have introduced some policy uncertainty, but Central Bank autonomy 
and domestic and international fundamentals tempered this concern.
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Venezuela
The Venezuelan data are especially troublesome for partisan theories. 
Chávez’s victory in 1998 is linked to a rapid rise in the EMBI, a mild 
increase in the pre-electoral period of 2000, a decrease throughout the recall 
election of 2004, and a moderate increase following the 2006 elections. 
What then explains why perception of risk increased only when Chávez was 
first elected in 1998 and a few months after his re-election in 2006?
The 1998 elections provided clear evidence that the two-party domi-
nance of the Punto Fijo system was over (Dietz & Myers, 2007). In 1998, 
Chávez, a former coup leader with no governing experience, was supported 
by a broad but largely uncoordinated base of voters disenchanted with sys-
temic parties and who applauded that he was “the only candidate to attack 
the market economics that the Caldera government belatedly accepted two 
years ago” (“The Americas,” 1998, p. 30). He proposed a more participa-
tory republic based on a vague ideology of “Bolivarianism,” which com-
bined elements of socialism, neostructuralism, and radical democracy. His 
enormous popularity was concerning to bondholders who identified him as 
a maverick who was entering a political vacuum where he would be capable 
of making very significant and unpredictable changes. His anticapitalist 
and anti-imperialist rhetoric gave clear signals that he was likely to use the 
oil wealth available to redistribute assets as opposed to paying debt. 
Moreover, given the low value of petroleum, Chávez would have few policy 
instruments available to make the social changes that he proposed, which 
could lead toward fiscal irresponsibility.
In office, Chávez showed policy restraint and even endorsed some con-
servative macroeconomic policies, while he continued to launch philippics 
against oligarchs (Buxton, 2003). So in 2000, he was hardly the candidate 
favored by the market, but bondholders had a better idea of how to separate the 
rhetoric from the policies. Importantly, the considerable support for the 1999 
constitution and the overwhelming victory of Chávez and the coalition of par-
ties and movements associated with him conferred a legitimacy and predictabil-
ity to the system. What was less predictable was whether Chávez would follow 
a developmentalist, state-led growth approach to macroeconomic policy or 
whether he would move toward socialism, as critics alleged (Lebowitz, 2006). 
The ambiguity of future policies while new rules of the game were being estab-
lished occurred alongside a recovery in global petroleum prices, which 
improved the government’s ability to continue to meet its foreign debt obliga-
tions and which were—and remained until 2007—fairly minimal, given the 
value of petroleum as potential collateral. Like the other countries studied here, 
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commodity prices are inversely correlated with risk, though the considerable 
value of petroleum, particularly since 2004, has provided assurances for 
Venezuela’s debt, even though it has pursued policies that are considered 
unwise and unsustainable by the majority of analysts of that market.
During the recall referendum of 2004, Chávez solidified his support, 
which was particularly essential in reducing policy uncertainty and con-
cerns about regime stability following the April coup of 2002 and the gen-
eral strike at the end of that year. Chávez was able to consolidate his regime 
in 2003 due to increased petroleum prices and the introduction of “social 
Missions.” By the time the recall election occurred in 2004, the economy 
was growing robustly, and state-directed social development programs 
were a regular part of Venezuelan life. This, combined with the lack of 
credibility of the opposition, led to a resounding victory for the government 
in the recall election of 2004. The significant decrease in the EMBI during 
the election campaign, thus, had nothing to do with a move away from a 
leftist politician or the moderation of that politician. If anything, Chávez 
became more committed to using fiscal policy in very aggressive ways to 
promote social equity. Rather, the decline in risk was due to the increased 
value of petroleum vis-à-vis the small foreign debt stock and the increasing 
consolidation of new rules of the game by Chávez.
The increased familiarity with Chávez, stockpiling of foreign currency 
reserves, and the boom in global markets explain the relatively mild change 
in the EMBI prior to 2006. His declarations about moving toward a vague 
21st-century socialism since 2005 did not mark a clear shift away from the 
general state-centered, prodomestic producer economy that he had been 
pursuing since at least 2003. The EMBI increased after his re-election, 
because he believed that he had a new mandate to change the “geometry of 
power,” which meant substantially altering the 1999 constitution. The effort 
proved unsuccessful, but what is relevant is that Chávez’s move to acceler-
ate the transition to 21st-century socialism through a very vague set of 69 
constitutional amendments rendered the policy environment unpredictable, 
driving up risk, even despite record prices for petroleum and robust dollar 
reserves. Thus, even when domestic and economic fundamentals are strong, 
policy uncertainty can drive risk.
Conclusion
There is little quantitative and qualitative support for partisan expla-
nations of sovereign risk related to elections in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
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and Venezuela between 1994 and 2007. This is true of both simple par-
tisan (right-left difference) and more sophisticated partisan accounts that 
distinguish between incumbent and challenging leftist candidates and 
between radical and institutional lefts. These results question how 
important the right-left scale is in studies of Latin America. The data 
also control for party system institutionalization, a variable often 
ignored in the analysis of how elections affect financial markets. The 
data show that older party systems in Latin America do not necessarily lead 
to increased stability and predictability of the political system, as is 
claimed by the literature on partisanship (Mainwaring, 1999).
The quantitative analysis is strongest in support of the role of external 
vulnerability and risk tolerance. This finding confirms conventional wisdom 
among market professionals, that risk is based on ability to pay debt, which 
is best represented by access to foreign currency. Foreign reserves are criti-
cal for emerging markets, particularly during downturns in global liquidity, 
because many emerging market borrowers issue debt in foreign currencies, 
creating a potentially unsustainable currency mismatch (Eichengreen & 
Hausmann, 2005). The obvious policy implication is that governments 
should try to denominate their debt in local currency and should maintain 
foreign currency reserves that exceed what may be considered adequate 
under noncrisis situations.
But how large the stock of foreign currency reserves should be to 
ensure confidence in a government’s ability to meet its debt obligations is 
subject to perception. This is where the policy environment enters and the 
issue of uncertainty emerges. A reserve of 30 billion U.S. dollars may be 
sufficient in one context but not in another. More important, for emerging 
market countries, it may be both at the same time, as was the case in 
Brazil in 2002, when perceptions of policy uncertainty led to the negative 
interpretation of foreign reserves driving the market. If economic funda-
mentals allow for multiple equilibria, policy clarity can explain percep-
tions of risk. Moreover, as is the case in the postelectoral period in 
Venezuela in 2006, political uncertainty can drive sovereign risk even in 
the face of record reserves and commodity prices. Thus, tracing interac-
tions between policy uncertainty, policies chosen, and vulnerability to 
external events best explains perceptions of sovereign movement during 
electoral periods.
Future research should examine these processes during ministerial shuf-
fles and other periods of change between elections. It should also examine 
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whether the relationship that credit markets perceive between risk and 
uncertainty is echoed in other arenas such as equity markets.
Notes
 1. Venezuela’s market is less important, but due to the foreign policy of president Chávez, 
the purchase of the debt of neighboring countries, and the burgeoning local currency debt 
market, it is becoming increasingly important.
 2. This is measured in terms of basis points, in which 100 basis points is the equivalent 
of 1%.
 3. When there is greater liquidity, interest in investing in emerging markets, or when 
commodity prices are high, investors will be less exacting. Perception that certain other coun-
tries or regions are “hot” can reduce market demand for the debt of a particular country and 
increase risk. Similarly, internal dynamics of capital markets can punish one country for the 
failures of another, ironically even if the former is seen as relatively successful. This was the 
case in 2001, when traders who lost money or could not sell Argentine debt sold Brazilian debt 
to cover their losses, increasing Brazil’s Emerging Markets Bond Index.
 4. Part of this is due to low levels of partisan ideology and/or policy clarity among many 
political parties (Mainwaring, 1999) and a relative convergence left and right in Latin America 
about economic policies in the most recent wave of democratization.
 5. The more recent classifications are considered to be preliminary by Coppedge (Personal 
communication, July 6, 2007).
 6. For example, the de la Rua Coalition was center left, but Nestor Kirchner was replaced 
by Eduardo Duhalde, a conservative. The Brazilian elections were also coded slightly differ-
ently. Given that there was significant continuity between the Itamar Franco and Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso administrations, both were coded as center.
 7. The dependent and independent variables were tested for unit root problems using the 
Dickey-Fuller test and detected problems only in the Consumer Price Index variable. Given that 
it did not present consistent effects on Emerging Markets Bond Index, it does not appear to be 
a substantial problem. A violation of homoskedasticity was detected in the pooled sample using 
the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity as well as a problem of first order 
correlation, using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. This was corrected by 
using cross-sectional time-series Feasible Generalized Least Squares regression for the pooled 
data and Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression for country-specific analysis.
 8. As stated earlier, left to right labels are not uncontroversial. Coppedge (1998) labels 
the Partido Justicialista (Peronist party) as center-right, and so that distinction is maintained 
here. Duhalde was clearly an opponent of the Peronists who surrounded president Menem, but 
he stressed social concerns more than Menem did.
 9. All electoral data are from Georgetown University’s Political Database on the 
Americas: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/elecdata.html
10. The linkage to Chávez is very important, as Evo Morales success seems to have been 
boosted by Chávez’s support, whereas Felipe Calderón and Alan Garcia were able to gain 
points by associating Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Ollanta Humala with Chávez.
11. Unlike previous efforts at controlling inflation, the real plan was more credible, largely 
because of the successful negotiation with Congress by Edmar Bacha, secretary of economic 
policies at that time, to anchor the new currency through fiscal restraint.
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